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Abstract
This paper proposes Bayesian estimates for welfare e¤ects of consumption
uctuations and growth. Annual data from 82 developed and developing coun-
tries indicate a large degree of uncertainty as regards point estimates. More-
over, the comparison between the welfare gain from consumption stabilization
and the welfare gain from growth yields inconclusive results for many devel-
oped and developing countries. These ndings suggest the need for caution in
drawing policy conclusions from point estimates.
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1 Introduction
Lucas (1987) measures the welfare cost of consumption uctuations as the percentage in-
crease in consumption, across all dates and states, required to leave a representative agent
indi¤erent between consumption uctuations and a smooth consumption path. According
to this denition, he obtains an estimate of 0:042 percent of consumption in the USA.1
Lucas then estimates the welfare loss of a one percent reduction in the growth rate at
20 percent of consumption. These results lead Lucas to conclude that further stabiliza-
tion would yield little welfare gain in the USA and that growth should be the priority of
macroeconomic policies.
A large body of research has challenged Lucasestimations by altering his modeling
framework. First, whereas Lucas employs a model based on a trend-stationary consump-
tion process and a CRRA utility function, Obstfeld (1994) and Dolmas (1998) adopt a
martingale consumption process and recursive preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989). The
predictions of their model indicate higher welfare costs of uctuations ranging from 0:1 to
4:31 percent. Second, another line of research relaxes Lucasassumptions on homogenous
agents and perfect capital markets. For instance, Imrohoruglu (1989) considers a general
equilibrium model with idiosyncratic shocks and liquidity constraints and nds the welfare
cost of uctuations in the range of 0:3  1:5 percent. Atkeson and Phelan (1994) extend
Imrohoruglu (1989) to the endogenous labor supply and asset pricing. Their results indi-
cate little welfare gain from stabilization as does Lucas (1987). In a related study, Krusell
and Smith (1999) propose a model with a variety of heterogeneity including employ-
ment status, wealth and preferences. They nd that poor unemployed individuals who
face liquidity constraints and rich individuals would benet from stabilization while the
middle-income class would lose. As a result, the welfare gain from eliminating uctuations
is negligible for the aggregate economy.
Third, Tallarini (2000) addresses the problem in a real business cycle (RBC) model
with Epstein-Zin type preferences, which are calibrated to be consistent with observed
asset prices in the USA. He nds much larger welfare cost of uctuations as of 44 per-
cent. Otrok (2001) also considers an RBC model. However, he nds little welfare gain
from stabilization with non-separable preferences, the parameter values of which are cho-
sen to match observed uctuations in the USA. The fourth strand of the literature is
based on endogenous growth models. For instance, Barlevy (2004) proposes a frame-
1This result is obtained with a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion equal to 5. For risk aversion levels
of 10 and 20, Lucas estimates the welfare cost of uctuations at 0:084 and 1:7 percent, respectively.
1
work with diminishing returns on investment. As a result, stabilization generates higher
growth through the reallocation of investment from periods of high investment to periods
of low investment. In turn, he nds the welfare cost of uctuations to be substantially
higher than in the original Lucas exercise. However, Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2006) chal-
lenge this nding in a model where uctuations and growth are endogenously determined.
Moreover, their model generates a positive relationship between uctuations and growth
as in Blackburn (1999). In this set-up, stabilization induces welfare costs. For a detailed
survey of the literature, see Barlevy (2005), Imrohoroglu (2008) and Lucas (2003).
This brief review shows that di¤erent modelling assumptions yield di¤erent estimated
values for the welfare cost of uctuations. In this article, I take a di¤erent approach to
examining the welfare e¤ects of consumption uctuations and growth. Instead of propos-
ing another model economy, I investigate the impact of parameter uncertainty on welfare
e¤ects. For this purpose, I use the model economy proposed in Dolmas (1998) and Obst-
feld (1994) and assess parameter uncertainty with Bayesian inference. In particular, the
sample from the posterior distribution of welfare e¤ects is obtained by repeatedly drawing
parameters of a consumption process from their posterior distribution. Moreover, I esti-
mate the posterior distribution for the di¤erence between the welfare cost of consumption
uctuations and the welfare e¤ects of growth. Subsequently, a 90 percent credible inter-
val is constructed to gauge the uncertainty on estimates of welfare e¤ects.2 This metric
also allows to examine whether the welfare gain from consumption stabilization and the
welfare gain from growth are signicantly di¤erent from one another. Lucas (1987) and
subsequent studies have relied on point estimates for such welfare comparison, thereby
neglecting the uncertainty surrounding their estimates. However, by ignoring uncertainty,
one cannot make statements about how likely these estimates are from their population
values. As a result, policy conclusions drawn from point estimates should be taken with
caution.
My second contribution to the discussion relates to a large number of countries included
in the empirical analysis. In particular, I examine data on 82 developed and developing
countries while earlier studies mostly focus on the USA. The few existing cross-country
studies include Pallage and Robe (2003) who compare point estimates for welfare e¤ects
across a group of African countries and the USA. Giannone and Reichlin (2005) compare
consumption responses to technology shocks between the Euro area and the USA and
2The credible interval has a di¤erent interpretation than the condence interval notion used in fre-
quentist statistics. For instance, a 90 percent credible interval (or region) gives the interval of minimum
length that contains the true value of a parameter with probability 90 percent.
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interpret the results in terms of the welfare cost of uctuations. Finally, Van Wincoop
(1994) examines the welfare gain from international risk sharing in the USA, Japan and
European-OECD countries.
Consumption data has three main characteristics: the trend growth, the size of uctu-
ations, and the degree of persistence of these uctuations. Given the di¤erences in these
three parameters and their uncertainty, how large are welfare e¤ects of consumption uc-
tuations and growth in developing countries compared to those in developed countries?
Are these welfare e¤ects similar across countries in each group? For instance, are welfare
e¤ects of consumption uctuations di¤erent between the USA and the European indus-
trialized countries? Analysis of data from a large number of developing and developed
countries enables these general questions to be addressed.
Moreover, developing countries represent a natural framework for the Lucas-type wel-
fare comparison. In particular, these countries display strong volatility in consumption
such that successful stabilization policies should substantially improve the welfare of their
residents. However, there has been an increasing emphasis on growth in these countries.
For instance, The World Bank (2004) argues that Africa needs to achieve a seven percent
long-term growth rate in order to meet the target for poverty reduction of the Millen-
nium Development Goals. To what extent then should developing countries focus on
stabilization or on growth 3 or on both policies?
The results show wide credible intervals for the welfare cost of consumption uctua-
tions in developed and developing countries, which indicates large uncertainty as regards
point estimates. Moreover, credible intervals for the di¤erence between the welfare gain
from consumption stabilization and the welfare gain from growth include zero for many
developed and developing countries. These ndings are robust as regards sub-samples
analysis and on di¤erent assumptions about the risk aversion parameter and the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution.
3Blackburn (1999) provides a theoretical support for the trade-o¤ between stabilization and growth.
Using an endogenous growth model, he shows that monetary stabilization policies lead to a lower long-
term growth. This result is based on a positive link between growth and volatility found in Blackburn
(1999). However, the relationship between growth and volatility hinges on the mechanism that generates
technological progress. When it is generated by the creative destructive mechanism, the link between
growth and volatility is positive (see, for example, Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998a), Aghion and Saint-
Paul (1998b); and Caballero and Hammour (1994)). However, if the mechanism generating technological
progress is learning by doing, the relationship between growth and volatility is found to be negative (see,
for example, Martin and Rogers (1997); and Ramey and Ramey (1991)).
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This paper is further organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical frame-
work; Section 3 gives empirical results; Section 4 provides the sensitivity and sub-period
analysis; and the last section concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Model economy
The model is taken from Dolmas (1998) and Obstfeld (1994). The ingredients are the
recursive preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989) and a stationary autoregressive process
for consumption growth.
2.1.1 Consumption
Denote real per capita consumption by Ct; t = 0; : : : ; T; and assume that the growth rate
gt =
Ct
Ct 1
  1 follows an AR(`) stationary process
gt = 0 +
P`
i=1
igt i + "t; (1)
where 0 is the constant term, the i; i = 1; : : : ; `; are AR coe¢ cients, and "t is the error
term, which is assumed to be i:i:d normally distributed as "t  N(0; 2): From Eq. (1)
the long-term growth rate of consumption is dened as the unconditional mean of gt :
g = Egt = 0=(1 
P`
i=1
i). Using the approximation ln(1 + gt) ' gt; Eq. (1) is equivalent
to assuming that lnCt follows an I(1) process with serially correlated increments.4 This
implies that innovations in growth have permanent e¤ects on consumption.
2.1.2 Preferences
With persistent shocks, Obstfeld (1994) argues that the risk aversion parameter and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) play specic roles in the welfare e¤ects of
consumption uctuations and growth. For instance, to the extent that a risk averse agent
prefers a smooth consumption path, an increase in the risk averse parameter will imply a
larger welfare cost of uctuations. In addition, given that current shocks persist over all
future periods, the total welfare cost of uctuations is a discounted sum of static welfare
4Merton (1971) shows that consumption follows a random walk process in an intertemporal optimiza-
tion framework. Empirical studies also support the random walk hypothesis (See, for example, Nelson
and Plosser (1982); Cooley and Ogaki (1996); and Ogaki (1992)).
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costs. Obstfeld (1994) shows that the discount rate of static welfare costs increases with
IES.5 As such, a higher IES would imply a larger total welfare cost of uctuations for
reasons that are not related to the risk aversion parameter. The standard CRRA utility
function cannot account for such a specic role because it assumes that IES is the inverse
of the risk aversion parameter, so a recursive utility formulation is more appropriate for
welfare analysis in the presence of persistent shocks.
Assume the representative agent has the recursive preferences of Epstein and Zin
(1989),
Ut =

C1 t + 

Et
 
U1 t+1
 1 
1 
 1
1 
; (2)
which is increasing, concave, and homogenous of degree one in Ct; where ; 0 <  < 1;
is a constant discount factor; , 0 <  6= 1; is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and
1=, 0 <  6= 1; is IES for deterministic consumption paths.6
2.2 Welfare e¤ects
Let   (; 2; g) and   (; 2; g) denote the welfare e¤ects of consumption uctua-
tions and growth, respectively, where  = (0 1 : : : `)
0. As in Lucas (1987),  represents
the percentage increase in consumption, across all dates and states, required to leave the
representative agent indi¤erent between consumption instability and a perfectly smooth
consumption path. Alternatively,  can be interpreted as the willingness to pay in order
to eliminate all volatility in consumption or as representing the welfare gain that would
be obtained if consumption were completely stabilized. In the same way,  measures the
additional consumption, across all dates and states, that the representative agent would
obtain if the trend growth g increases by one percent.7
The calculation of  and  follows from the value function iteration method employed
in Dolmas (1998).8 Rewrite (2) as
5This result holds provided that the mean adjusted growth rate is positive. When the mean adjusted
growth is negative the opposite relationship is true (see Obstfeld (1994)). In any case when shocks are
persistent, IES a¤ects welfare e¤ects of consumption uctuations and growth for reasons that are not
related to the risk aversion parameter.
6Note that (2) reduces to the CRRA utility function if  =  : Ut = E
1P
j=0
j 11 C
1 
t+j :
7This benchmark of one percent long-term growth is used to make the results comparable with the
literature (See, for example, Dolmas (1998), Lucas (1987), Obstfeld (1994), and Pallage and Robe (2003)).
8However, Dolmas (1998) assumes an AR(1) consumption process. Moreover, when the autoregressive
coe¢ cients i are restricted to zero Obstfeld (1994) derives close form solutions for  and :
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v(ct) =

1 + 

E (ct+1v(ct+1) j ct)1 
 1 
1 
 1
1 
; (3)
where ct = CtCt 1 ; ct = (ct; : : : ; ct `+1) ; v(ct) is a normalized value function dened as
Ctv(ct) = V (Ct; ct); with V (Ct; ct)  Ut: The stochastic consumption process in Eq. (1)
is approximated by a nite state Markov chain process with the methodology proposed
by Tauchen (1986). As such, the normalized value functions can be expressed in terms of
discrete values of consumption growth fc1; c2; : : : ; cng across n states. Subsequently, the
discrete normalized value functions are solved iteratively9 until successive values di¤er by
no more than 10 8.
After solving for the normalized value functions, the welfare cost of consumption
uctuation gives10
 =
vdet
vsto
  1; (4)
where vdet =

1
1 (1+g)1 
 1
1 
is the normalized value function for deterministic consump-
tion paths obtained by plugging the deterministic consumption growth g in Eq. (3), and
vsto is the corresponding value function for the stochastic consumption process. In par-
ticular, vsto is estimated as the weighted average of the normalized value functions across
the n states where the weights are the invariant probabilities j; j = 1; : : : ; n;. Formally:
vsto =
nP
j=1
jv(c
j): (5)
The welfare gain from growth is obtained in an analogous way:
 =
nP
j=1
gi v(c
j
g)
nP
j=1
jv(c
j)
  1: (6)
where gj ; j = 1; : : : ; n, is the invariant probability associated with the value function
v(cjg) for state j (when the mean growth rate is increased by one percent).
There are two issues related to the nite state Markov chain approximation: the
lag length in the AR process and the number of discrete states. With respect to the
9Under Blackwell (1965)conditions, it can be shown that the value function iteration method yields
a unique solution (see for instance Stokey et al. (1989) and Sargent and Ljungqvist (2000)).
10This expression is obtained under the assumption of homogeneity of the utility function.
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lag length, a preliminary analysis of the data indicates that the fourth AR coe¢ cient is
not statistically di¤erent from zero at the 10 percent signicance level for any country.
Therefore, I start by estimating an AR(3) process. If the third AR coe¢ cient is not
signicant at 10 percent for a country the corresponding lag regressor is removed and the
model is re-estimated. This procedure continues until an AR coe¢ cient is signicant at
10 percent. If no AR coe¢ cient is signicantly di¤erent from zero, I simply regress the
growth rate on the constant term. In the case where the lag length is greater than one,
the AR process is rewritten as a V AR(1) model, which is also approximated by a nite
state Markov chain process.11 See Tauchen (1986) for technical details.
For the selection of the number of states, I follow the procedure used by Otrok et al.
(2002). In particular, the number of discrete states is chosen such that the rst four
moments and the six auto-correlations of the Markov process match the ones of the
continuous AR process. In general, I nd a good approximation when the number of
discrete states is set to n = 19 for the AR(1) process and to n = 5` for the V AR(1)
process.12
2.3 Posterior distributions of welfare e¤ects
This section discusses the proposed Bayesian inference on  and . For this purpose, it is
assumed that only uncertainty related to the estimation of  and 2 matter for inference
on  and . Moreover,  and  are complicated functions of  and 2 such that the
functional form of their posterior distributions cannot be directly obtained. To overcome
this di¢ culty, a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is used to simulate the
posterior distributions of  and : At each step k; k = 1; : : : ; K; of the chain, (k) and 2
(k)
are drawn from their posterior distributions, the functional forms of which are explicitly
known. Subsequently, (k) and (k) are calculated with the methodology explained in
Section 2.2. This procedure is repeated until convergence.
Given Eq. (1) the likelihood function, conditional on the data = fx; (g0; : : : ; g` 1)g ; is
L(; 2 j data) = (22) T `+12 exp

  1
22
(x X)0(x X)

; (7)
11Otrok et al. (2002) use a similar approach. Chris Otrok also generously posts the approximation
codes of the VAR(1) process on his web page http://people.virginia.edu/~cmo3h/
12Note that the number of total possible states for the V AR(1) process has a general formula n = n`1
where n1 is the number of grid points for each of the ` variables: For instance, ` = 2 in the case of an
AR(2) process. Therefore, for each discrete value of variable 1, variable 2 can take any of the n1 grid
points.
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where (g0; : : : ; g` 1) are treated as xed initial conditions, x = (g`; : : : ; gT )0; " = ("`; : : : ; "T )0;
 = (0 1 : : : `)
0 and X is a (T   `+ 1) (`+ 1) matrix of ones and lagged observations
on x: Eq. (7) implies that conditional on 2;  has a normal distribution. In the same way,
conditional on ; 2 has an inverted Gamma distribution. Assuming natural conjugate
priors for  j 2 and 2 j ;
 j 2N(;0)Is() and 2 j IG(0
2
;
0
2
) (8)
yields the following conditional posterior distributions
 j 2; dataN(e;1)Is(); (9)
2 j ; dataIG(1
2
;
1
2
); (10)
where e = (+ 2X 0X) 1( 10 + 2X 0c), 1 = ( 10 + 2X 0X); 1 = 0+(T   `+ 1) ;
and 1 = 0 + (x   X)0(x   X); with the following di¤use prior parametrization:
0 = 4000I`; = (0 0; : : : ; 0)
0 and 0 = 0 = 0: Is() is an indicator function that puts
a zero prior mass on the region of the parameter space where draws on (; 2) are not
stationary.13 Moreover, draws that generate negative values or values that lie outside the
unit circle for ; and  are discarded. These restrictions derive from  and  being able
to be interpreted as shares of consumption that the agent is willing to pay for in order to
eliminate uctuations and to reduce growth, respectively.
Given the dependence between the posterior distributions of  j 2 and 2 j ; a
Gibbs sampling method, which also belongs to the class of MCMC methods, is used.
More formally, the algorithm used to estimate the conditional posterior distributions of
, 2; ; and  can be summarized as follows. After choosing a starting value (0); the
MCMC method generates a sequence of draws
n
(k); 2
(k)
; (k); (k)
o
; k = 1; : : : ; K; in
the following steps:
1. 2
(k) j (k 1) is drawn from (10);
2. (k) j 2(k 1) is drawn from (9);
3. (k) and (k) are calculated with the methodology explained in Section 2.2. Moreover,
(k)   (k) is calculated at each iteration;
13Stationarity requires that the roots of the characteristic equation (1   1z   2z2   : : :  `z` = 0)
lie outside the unit circle.
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4. Repeat steps 1   3 K times. The results reported in the paper are based on 2000
draws plus a burn-in phase of 200 replications (i.e. K = 2200).
I check convergence of the chain in two ways. First, I experimented with di¤erent num-
bers of draws ranging from 1000 to 2000 and the results remained qualitatively unchanged.
Second, the Geweke (1991) test indicates that convergence cannot be rejected.14
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
I use annual data on real private consumption per capita from 1960 to 2003. The data
are expressed in constant dollars (international prices, base year 2000). They are taken
from the Penn World Table, version 6:2 (Heston et al. (2006)). I restrict the analysis to
a balanced data set on countries with at least grade C data quality.15 This leads to a
sample of 82 countries, 25 developed and 57 developing countries.16
Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A report OLS estimation results for the AR consump-
tion process. The data indicate that developing countries display larger shocks (large 2)
to consumption than do developed countries. This result is consistent with ndings in
the literature (See, for example, Agenor et al. (2000) and Mendoza (1995)). However, the
results in Tables A1 and A2 show a higher persistence of shocks in developed countries.
Moreover, these results are in line with the ndings of Giannone and Reichlin (2005) that
consumption responses to technology shocks are more persistent in the Euro area than
in the USA. In this paper, the persistence of shocks is measured by the largest root of
the characteristic polynomial of the AR process (see Stock (1991)). Everything else be-
ing equal, a higher persistence of shocks will imply a larger welfare cost of consumption
uctuations. The reason is that the more persistent the shocks are, the more long-lasting
their e¤ects and the more welfare loss they will generate. As a result, it is interesting to
see how the combination of the size and persistence of shocks a¤ect the comparison of
welfare e¤ects across countries.
14The Geweke (1991) convergence test amounts to splitting the 2000 draws on each parameter into
three consecutive equally sized sub-samples. Under the null hypothesis of convergence, the moments of
the draws in the rst and third sub-samples are equal. For the test, I concentrate on the rst and second
moments:
15Heston et al. (2006) provide information on the quality of the data of each country ranging from A
to D with grade A representing the best quality.
16The classication between developed and developing countries is obtained from the World Developing
Indicators (2010), where developed countries are dened as high income countries.
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3.2 Main results
The entire empirical analysis assumes  = 0:96, which is the value often used in the
literature for annual data. For the risk aversion parameter () and IES (1=), the results
presented in this section are based on  = 5:0 and  = 1:5; which are also the values
commonly used in empirical macroeconomics. However, there is debate about the value
of  in the nance literature. Section 4 presents the results for higher values of  and IES.
Tables 1 and 2 present the median together with the 5th and 95th quantiles of the
posterior distributions of ;  and   :
Table 1: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developed countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Australia :89 1:24 1:81 18:59 19:45 20:42  19:10  18:20  17:23
Austria 2:10 4:74 20:12 17:26 18:83 22:84  16:59  14:14  1:66
Belgium 2:79 8:68 47:72 17:80 20:40 31:57  16:72  11:84 18:37
Canada 1:63 2:83 6:33 18:21 19:77 21:54  18:57  16:87  13:39
Denmark 2:05 2:92 4:46 19:50 20:94 22:63  19:51  17:98  16:30
Finland 3:54 5:12 7:87 17:23 18:86 20:88  15:59  13:68  11:09
France 1:90 4:09 17:34 17:54 19:27 23:38  17:38  15:12  4:39
Greece 5:63 14:20 55:55 16:10 18:85 26:53  12:14  4:58 31:19
Greece 2:90 4:08 6:07 16:10 17:42 18:97  14:87  13:33  11:32
Iceland 12:87 23:17 54:46 17:02 20:14 26:20  5:92 2:76 30:65
Ireland 4:31 8:57 25:40 16:72 18:86 23:16  14:34  10:27 4:99
Israel 4:07 6:29 11:42 17:05 18:32 20:11  14:22  12:06  7:42
Italy 3:25 8:11 44:01 17:20 19:62 29:74  15:50  11:42 15:73
Japan 8:54 23:49 78:95 16:67 20:96 32:57  9:72 2:72 46:76
Korea 5:55 8:13 12:67 13:75 15:28 17:33  9:53  7:12  3:36
New Zealand 2:86 5:01 12:25 20:19 22:09 24:85  19:42  17:00  10:76
Norway 2:00 2:92 4:42 17:63 18:89 20:41  17:40  15:98  14:39
Portugal 9:90 19:72 52:74 16:07 19:37 25:94  8:10 :23 29:08
Spain 4:54 10:27 36:27 16:87 19:59 26:77  14:27  9:37 10:65
Sweden 2:52 4:93 14:59 19:30 21:47 25:17  19:17  16:40  8:23
UK 2:01 3:72 10:18 17:66 19:12 21:34  17:23  15:35  9:66
USA 1:16 2:07 5:33 17:45 18:61 20:14  17:80  16:49  13:39
The results indicate large uncertainty on estimates of the welfare cost of consumption
uctuations. For example, looking at the USA results, the 90 percent credible interval
for  is [1:16; 5:33] percent of consumption. Using identical preference parameter values,
Pallage and Robe (2003) nd a 2:11 percent point estimate for . However, the credible
interval for  suggests considerable uncertainty around this value. In international dollar
terms taking the USA average annual real per capita consumption to be $15790:30 for
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Table 2: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Argentina 15:86 25:17 43:95 21:00 26:01 33:88  8:22  0:87 12:97
Barbados 16:24 25:72 46:03 19:69 24:20 31:99  6:48 1:58 15:97
Benin 8:75 13:29 21:93 20:11 23:44 28:09  14:24  10:29  3:76
Burkina Faso 8:20 12:32 20:36 20:59 24:02 28:88  15:64  11:51  5:88
Bolivia 6:42 11:57 30:17 22:13 25:00 30:87  18:28  13:50 1:13
Brazil 8:53 12:64 20:94 16:46 18:86 22:32  9:90  6:16 0:01
Burundi 31:78 53:50 89:10 23:26 31:49 44:19 5:15 21:68 48:91
Cameroon 24:67 50:33 92:10 21:48 28:06 39:04 0:10 22:13 58:26
Chile 30:09 51:07 87:03 17:70 23:36 31:93 10:44 27:63 57:65
China 5:67 10:76 28:99 13:43 15:34 18:96  8:92  4:68 11:13
Cote dIvoire 14:57 22:52 38:33 20:03 24:39 31:68  8:52  1:74 9:53
1960  2003 these estimates correspond to a welfare cost of about [183; 843] per person
and per year in 1960 2003. Thus, while the literature shows conicting point estimates for
 across di¤erent models, estimates obtained from a particular model display considerable
uncertainty. As such, one should account for this uncertainty when comparing  with :
Results for other countries show even greater uncertainty. For instance, the credible
intervals for  in France and Morocco are, respectively [1:90; 16:77] and [10:02; 42:52]
percent of consumption. Given this large uncertainty, one should be very careful in
interpreting the point estimates reported in earlier studies. Note, however, that estimates
of  display relatively less uncertainty:
In order to compare estimates of  and  between developed and developing coun-
tries, I calculate the unweighted average of posterior quantiles in each group. This yields
the following 90 percent credible intervals for  in developed and developing countries;
respectively [4:0; 24:95] and [17:73; 51:26] percent. The corresponding gures for  are
[17:42; 23:98] and [19:85; 31:14] : These estimates imply that, while the welfare costs of
consumption uctuations are on average two to four times larger in developing countries
than in developed countries the welfare e¤ects of growth are only marginally larger in the
former than in the latter.
Comparing the results among developing countries reveals that Sub-Saharan Africa
and oil producing countries of the Middle East would gain most from further consumption
stabilization, followed by South and Latin American countries and Asian countries. The
di¤erence in the magnitude of the welfare cost of uctuations is mainly due to the size of
the shocks. In line with this explanation, oil-producing countries (such as Nigeria, Congo,
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Table 2: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
(Continued)
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Colombia 5:17 12:41 52:82 20:03 23:35 32:32  16:89  10:97 21:54
Congo 49:89 78:46 97:69 23:09 31:14 40:56 23:55 46:24 63:76
Costa Rica 8:58 16:37 46:00 19:00 22:76 29:87  13:48  6:32 18:60
Dominican, Rep. 20:85 33:18 62:36 16:79 20:67 28:38 2:20 12:52 36:00
Ecuador 5:20 10:23 33:01 19:41 22:36 28:68  17:03  11:82 6:55
Egypt 5:64 8:31 12:88 17:35 19:36 22:09  13:77  11:04  7:09
El Salvador 12:72 27:55 75:23 19:67 25:10 36:57  10:35 2:21 41:89
Ethiopia 20:47 34:92 69:64 20:07 25:13 34:30  2:19 9:73 37:60
Gabon 51:38 78:85 97:80 18:82 24:47 31:84 30:39 53:61 70:96
Gambia 52:89 80:23 97:76 22:40 29:55 37:94 27:55 49:82 66:33
Ghana 25:59 42:36 78:06 24:43 32:53 46:67  2:89 9:92 34:32
Guatemala 5:06 13:44 64:51 21:71 25:78 39:52  19:35  12:03 26:71
Guinea 7:44 10:91 17:43 21:61 24:72 29:20  17:45  13:83  8:91
Hong Kong 9:29 18:69 52:10 13:86 16:44 22:00  5:86 2:28 32:46
Honduras 5:56 8:05 12:37 20:94 23:52 26:93  18:49  15:41  11:60
India 3:66 5:26 8:04 18:19 19:92 22:13  16:74  14:63  12:17
Indonesia 8:39 15:88 43:04 14:80 17:30 22:51  8:01  1:42 21:87
Iran 29:91 49:83 87:11 20:31 26:60 36:64 7:25 22:83 52:84
Jamaica 18:64 36:44 84:53 21:73 28:26 41:53  6:77 8:41 46:19
Jordan 47:10 77:75 97:70 23:32 31:45 42:70 19:53 44:87 65:79
Kenya 19:08 32:58 66:05 24:71 30:94 42:71  9:55 1:32 27:49
Luxembourg 1:50 2:12 3:14 17:19 18:22 19:39  17:24  16:08  14:78
Madagascar 8:51 12:72 20:67 27:91 33:03 41:08  25:70  20:22  14:34
Malawi 7:74 11:90 20:99 18:94 21:56 25:48  13:54  9:74  2:06
Malaysia 11:91 22:61 60:04 15:84 19:13 25:82  5:81 3:53 35:30
Mali 15:17 24:63 47:43 20:63 24:80 32:08  7:87  0:32 17:49
Mauritius 28:89 47:55 85:40 16:11 20:94 28:96 11:07 26:38 57:67
Mexico 6:18 10:87 28:35 18:66 21:63 26:78  15:19  10:53 3:20
Morocco 10:02 17:74 42:52 18:94 22:01 28:07  10:76  4:12 15:97
Nepal 3:05 4:53 7:42 20:70 22:48 24:79  19:90  18:00  15:14
Netherlands 3:09 6:01 15:94 17:64 19:63 22:99  16:65  13:68  4:49
Nigeria 47:23 75:45 97:55 25:66 33:02 42:52 18:63 41:76 61:50
Pakistan 6:88 10:10 15:88 17:50 19:81 22:98  12:87  9:75  5:08
Panama 12:59 20:01 35:57 18:01 21:00 25:90  7:28  0:96 11:91
Paraguay 8:66 12:77 20:38 18:30 21:12 25:24  12:19  8:37  2:52
Peru 17:92 28:90 51:77 19:12 23:71 31:91  3:47 5:12 22:78
Philippines 2:36 4:15 9:37 19:30 20:87 22:89  18:83  16:71  11:91
Rwanda 44:38 70:74 96:09 21:89 29:49 39:41 18:96 40:40 62:62
South Africa 3:68 7:38 23:26 19:44 21:96 26:87  18:22  14:53  1:62
Senegal 8:87 13:29 21:69 23:31 27:44 33:42  18:49  14:11  8:15
Sri Lanka 8:07 11:96 19:29 16:22 18:60 21:75  10:20  6:54  0:90
Switzerland 1:80 4:17 15:54 19:74 21:89 26:29  20:20  17:62  8:24
Syria 49:30 76:55 97:74 18:24 23:40 29:62 28:96 52:32 72:28
Tanzania 6:21 11:90 35:46 22:51 25:58 31:90  19:03  13:50 5:11
Thailand 5:91 11:02 33:49 15:15 17:36 21:60  10:94  6:28 12:25
Trinidad 25:45 41:54 77:44 18:17 23:30 32:31 5:32 18:24 47:56
Uruguay 16:85 31:53 76:46 20:84 25:40 34:04  6:72 6:40 44:02
Venezuela 23:70 48:05 90:58 20:80 27:67 39:65  0:55 20:01 55:08
Zambia 47:86 75:82 97:50 25:74 34:67 46:82 17:99 39:57 59:78
Zimbabwe 64:43 87:93 98:90 19:98 25:59 32:32 41:29 61:25 72:77
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Table 3: Summary results
Developed Developing
Growth Stabilization Inconclusive Growth Stabilization Inconclusive
Australia Belgium Benin Burundi Argentina
Austria Greece Brazil Chile Barbados
Canada Hong Kong Burkina Faso Congo Bolivia
Denmark Iceland Egypt Dominican, Rep. Cameroon
Finland Ireland Guinea Gabon China
France Italy Honduras Gambia Colombia
Israel Japan India Iran Costa Rica
Korea Portugal Madagascar Jamaica Cote dIvoire
Luxembourg Spain Malawi Jordan Ecuador
Netherlands Nepal Mauritius El Salvador
New Zealand Pakistan Nigeria Ethiopia
Norway Paraguay Rwanda Ghana
Sweden Philippines Syria Guatemala
Switzerland Senegal Trinidad & Tobago Indonesia
UK South Africa Zambia Kenya
USA Sri Lanka Zimbabwe Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Panama
Peru
Tanzania
Thailand
Uruguay
Venezuela
Gabon, Jordan, Iran, Syria, and Cameroon) and countries that experienced wars and
political crises (e.g. Burundi, Rwanda, Zimbabwe) are the ones that would benet the
most from consumption stabilization. Across developed countries, the following countries
would also gain relatively more from consumption stabilization: Hong Kong, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Compared to other developed countries
these countries are characterized by larger consumption uctuations and highly persistent
shocks. Developed countries such as Australia, Luxembourg, and the USA would gain
relatively less from further consumption stabilization.
Let us now compare the welfare gain from consumption stabilization with the welfare
gain from long-term growth as in Lucasoriginal exercise.17 The last three columns of
17Note that this comparison does not take into account the cost of implementing policies. Moreover,
it might not be feasible to remove all uctuations in consumption or to achieve an increase in long-term
growth by one percent in a country.
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Tables 1 and 2 report posterior quantiles on    : Table 3 summarizes results in these
three last columns by classifying countries into three categories: i) growth when the 90
credible interval for     has negative bounds; ii) stabilization when it has positive
bounds; and iii) inconclusive when it includes zero.
Two main ndings can be derived from Table 3. First, the welfare comparison is
inconclusive in 34 developed and developing countries, amounting to 42 percent of the
sample size. This is very high. Moreover, the rate of inconclusiveness is somehow higher
in developing countries (44 percent) than in developed countries (36 percent). Second,
when the welfare comparison yields conclusive results, all of the developed countries would
gain more from growth than from stabilization. In the case of developing countries, one
half of the countries would benet from growth and the other half from stabilization.
These ndings suggest the need for caution in interpreting point estimates reported in
the literature, especially as regards developing countries.
4 Sensitivity and sub-period analysis
This section presents sensitivity analysis with respect to the risk aversion parameter ()
and IES (1=): Moreover, a sub-period analysis is provided in order to account for a
possible parameter instability of the AR process. Before presenting the results I rst
examine how ,  and the parameters of the AR process a¤ect  and : Table 4 displays
medians of the posterior distribution of  and  in France for various combinations of 
and  in the set f1:5; 2:0; 2:5; 5:0g.
Table 4: Median posterior welfare e¤ects in France
 (%)  (%)
 = 1:5  = 2  = 2:5  = 5  = 1:5  = 2  = 2:5  = 5
 = 1:5 :73 :59 :50 :31 18:78 14:57 11:87 6:04
 = 2 1:20 :96 :81 :46 18:85 14:63 11:93 6:09
 = 2:5 1:68 1:34 1:11 :60 18:92 14:72 12:02 6:14
 = 5 4:09 3:26 2:69 1:36 19:27 15:13 12:41 6:40
For a given value of ;  increases with the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, .
This relationship reects the preference for a smooth consumption path for risk-averse
consumers. As a result, the more risk averse a person is, the more welfare compensation
he would require in order to eliminate uctuations in consumption. Alternatively, with 
held constant,  decreases with . This result captures the positive impact of IES (i.e.
14
Figure 1: The role of persistence, volatility and growth on welfare e¤ects
Notes: Figures obtained with an AR(2) process and  = 2:5;  = 5. The top panel assumes 1 = :20
and the value of 2 is allowed to vary between  :1 and :25. Moreover, g = 1:6 percent.
1=) on the welfare cost of consumption uctuations in the presence of persistent shocks.
In particular, when shocks are persistent, the discount factor of static welfare costs of
consumption uctuations over time increases with IES.18
In order to have a better understanding of the impacts of the parameters of the AR
process (2; i; g) on  and ; I consider articial countries, each characterized by di¤erent
parametrization of an AR(2) consumption process. Figure 1, which reports the implied
values of  and ; shows that the welfare cost of uctuations increases with both the size
and the persistence of shocks.
The larger the shocks, the more consumers nd them costly and the more they will
be willing to pay in order to have a smooth consumption path. In addition, the more
persistent the shocks the more long lasting will be their e¤ects and the more welfare loss
they will generate. By contrast, the welfare loss of uctuations is high for low values
of the long-term growth rate. This result suggests that volatility hits poor consumers
18This result holds provided that the mean adjusted growth rate (i.e. g  122) is positive. When the
mean adjusted growth is negative the opposite relationship is true (see Obstfeld (1994)).
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harder than the rich. In particular, volatility has a very large welfare detrimental e¤ect
on consumers that are close to subsistence.
Table 5: Summary results with higher risk aversion
Developed Developing
Growth Stabilization Inconclusive Growth Stabilization Inconclusive
Australia Iceland Austria India Argentina Benin
Canada Portugal Belgium Nepal Barbados Burkina Faso
Denmark Hong Kong France Burundi Bolivia
Finland Greece Cameroon Brazil
Norway Ireland Chile China
USA Israel Cote dIvoire Colombia
Luxembourg Italy Congo Costa Rica
Japan Dominican, Rep. Ecuador
Korea El Salvador Egypt
New Zealand Ethiopia Guatemala
Spain Gabon Guinea
Sweden Gambia Honduras
UK Ghana Madagascar
Netherlands Indonesia Malawi
Switzerland Iran Mexico
Jamaica Morocco
Jordan Pakistan
Kenya Paraguay
Mali South Africa
Mauritius Senegal
Nigeria Sri Lanka
Panama Tanzania
Peru Thailand
Rwanda Uruguay
Syria
Trinidad
Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe
4.1 Higher risk aversion level and IES
There is dispute about the empirical values of  and :19 Due to this debate this section
analyzes the impact of doubling the risk aversion () and IES (1=). In particular, I
19For instance, Ogaki et al. (1996) nd estimated values for  ranging from 2.26 to 2.96 for low-income
countries; from 1.32 to 2.51 for lower-middle-income countries; from 1.26 to 2.38 for upper middle income
countries; and from 1.21 to 2.29 for high income countries. Hall (1988) argues that the elasticity is
unlikely to be much above 0.1, and may well be zeroin the USA. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) estimate
a value of about 3 for the UK. For the risk aversion parameter, Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Kandel
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reestimate welfare e¤ects under the following two preferences parametrizations: i)  = 10
and  = 1:5; and ii)  = 5 and  = :75. Tables 5 and 6 report summary results analogous
to Table 3. See Appendices B and C for the detailed results.
Table 6: Summary results with higher IES
Developed Developing
Growth Stabilization Inconclusive Growth Stabilization Inconclusive
Australia Austria Benin Burundi Argentina
Canada Belgium Burkina Faso Cameroon Barbados
Denmark Greece Egypt Chile Bolivia
Finland Hong Kong Guinea Congo Brazil
France Iceland Honduras Dominican, Rep. China
Israel Ireland India Gabon Cote dIvoire
Korea Italy Madagascar Gambia Colombia
Luxembourg Japan Malawi Iran Costa Rica
Netherlands Portugal Nepal Jordan Ecuador
New Zealand Spain Pakistan Mauritius El Salvador
Norway Paraguay Nigeria Ethiopia
Sweden Philippines Rwanda Ghana
Switzerland Senegal Syria Guatemala
UK South Africa Trinidad & Tobago Indonesia
USA Sri Lanka Zambia Jamaica
Zimbabwe Kenya
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Panama
Peru
Tanzania
Thailand
Uruguay
Venezuela
Doubling the risk aversion level leads to a marginal increase of inconclusive cases (39
versus 34 countries). However, the new inconclusive cases primarily concern developed
countries (15 versus 9). Doubling the risk aversion level also has other e¤ects. For
instance, Iceland, Portugal and Hong Kong shift from inconclusive to stabilization. In the
same way, Egypt moves from growth to inconclusive. These re-classications that occur
following increase in risk aversion constitute another aspect of uncertainty of the results.
and Stambaugh (1991) argue that values as high as 30 cannot be ruled out. One problem with these
estimates is that they are based on the CRRA utility function in which the risk aversion is the inverse of
IES.
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By contrast, doubling IES does not change the classication of developed countries. The
results for developing countries also do not change except for two cases: Brazil moves
from growth to inconclusive, and Cameroon switches from inconclusive to stabilization.
Figure 2: Rolling standard deviation of consumption growth
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Developed
Developing
Note: The value for 1970 is the standard deviation of per capita
growth rates for the period 1961  1970. The value for 1971 refers
to 1962  1971, etc.
4.2 Sub-period Analysis
Finally, this section repeats the welfare comparison analysis on two di¤erent sub-periods.
The motivation for the sub-period analysis is to account for structural breaks in the data.
For instance, the literature identies a decline of uctuations in many countries from the
mid-1980s. This phenomenon is referred to as the great moderation. Figure 2, which plots
the cross-country unweighted average values of 10-year rolling estimates of the standard
deviation of real consumption per capita growth, illustrates this. However, the data show
that consumption volatility is still much higher in developing countries compared to their
developed counterparts. In order to investigate the impact of the great moderation on
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the welfare comparison the following two sub-periods are considered: 1960   1985 and
1986   2003.20 For each of the sub-periods, I again carry out the lag-selection exercise
and estimate the posterior distribution of  and  assuming  = 5 and  = 1:5. Tables
7 and 8 report summary results analogous to Table 3. See Appendices D and E for the
detailed results.
Table 7: Summary results: 1960-1985
Developed Developing
Growth Stabilization Inconclusive Growth Stabilization Inconclusive
Australia Austria Belgium Nepal Brazil Argentina
Korea Canada Denmark Cameroon Barbados
New Zealand Finland France Chile Benin
Switzerland Hong Kong Greece Cote dIvoire Burkina Faso
UK Norway Iceland Dominican. Rep., Bolivia
Portugal Ireland Egypt Burundi
Israel El Salvador China
Italy Gabon Colombia
Japan India Congo
Luxembourg Indonesia Costa Rica
Netherlands Jordan Ecuador
Spain Kenya Ethiopia
Sweden Malaysia Gambia
USA Mauritius Ghana
Morocco Guatemala
Nigeria Guinea
Pakistan Honduras
Paraguay Iran
Peru Jamaica
Sri Lanka Madagascar
Syria Malawi
Thailand Mali
Trinidad & Tobago Mexico
Venezuela Panama
Zimbabwe Philippines
Rwanda
South Africa
Senegal
Tanzania
Uruguay
Zambia
20The break year of 1985 is also considered in other cross-country studies (See, for example, Kose et al.
(2005))
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Table 8: Summary Results: 1986-2003
Developed Developing
Growth Stabilization Inconclusive Growth Stabilization Inconclusive
Austria Australia Benin Ethiopia Argentina
Belgium Denmark Bolivia Gambia Barbados
Canada Greece Brazil Jordan Burkina Faso
Finland Hong Kong Chile Mali Burundi
France Ireland Ecuador Nigeria Cameroon
Iceland Japan Egypt Peru China
Israel Korea Guatemala Rwanda Cote dIvoire
Italy Netherlands Honduras Syria Colombia
Luxembourg New Zealand India Trinidad & Tobago Congo
Norway Portugal Mauritius Zambia Costa Rica
Switzerland Spain Pakistan Zimbabwe Dominican, Rep.
USA Sweden Philippines El Salvador
UK Senegal Gabon
Sri Lanka Ghana
Guinea
Indonesia
Iran
Jamaica
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Nepal
Panama
Paraguay
South Africa
Tanzania
Thailand
Uruguay
Venezuela
The results suggest that the time period under study plays an important role. Taking
Belgium as an example, the credible interval for    includes zero in the rst sub-period
while it has negative bounds in the second sub-period. This result could be explained
by the fact that Belgium faced relatively smaller shocks in the second sub-period. In
addition, the persistence of shocks has decreased in the second sub-period for Belgium.
As a result, the welfare cost of uctuations decreased in relative terms across the two
periods. Overall, the welfare comparison di¤ers across the two sub-periods. Moreover,
the sub-sample analysis shows more inconclusive cases, especially for developing countries.
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These ndings indicate larger uncertainty on earlier estimates obtained with small sample
period data.
5 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a framework for inference on welfare e¤ects of consumption
uctuations and growth. The literature has thus far produced only point estimates.
Moreover, the empirical analysis here examines data from 82 developed and developing
countries while most existing studies focus on the USA. In addition, the data cover a
relatively long time period (1960   2003), and it is shown how the results evolve across
sub-periods.
The results show large credible intervals on the welfare cost of consumption uctu-
ations, which suggests great uncertainty as regards previously reported point estimates.
Thus, while the literature shows conicting point estimates of welfare e¤ects across dif-
ferent models, this paper nds that estimates obtained from a particular model economy
can display considerable uncertainty. As such, one should account for this uncertainty in
the comparison between the welfare gain from consumption stabilization and the welfare
gain from growth. Credible intervals for the di¤erence between the welfare gain from
consumption stabilization and the welfare gain from growth include zero in many devel-
oped and developing countries. Sub-period and sensitivity analysis support these results.
These ndings suggest the need for caution in drawing strong policy conclusions from
point estimates.
The framework proposed in this paper can be extended to account for uncertainty
about the risk aversion parameter and IES implied by data on consumption.
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A OLS estimation of the AR process
Table A1: OLS estimates of the AR process in developed countries
0 1 2 3 Lar g (%)  (%)
Australia :02 (:00) :00 2:12 1:60
Austria :02 (:01) :11 (:16) :29 (:16) :60 2:72 1:90
Belgium :01 (:01) :33 (:15)  :06 (:16) :43 (:15) :85 2:13 1:52
Canada :02 (:00) :25 (:14) :25 2:09 1:88
Denmark :02 (:00) :00 1:60 2:38
Finland :03 (:01) :00 2:67 3:30
France :01 (:00) :60 (:13) :60 2:42 1:38
Greece :02 (:01) :22 (:15) :33 (:15) :69 3:19 2:73
Hong Kong :03 (:01) :34 (:15) :34 4:98 4:83
Iceland :03 (:01) :27 (:15)  :29 (:15) :54 3:29 5:75
Ireland :02 (:01) :42 (:14) :42 2:87 2:72
Israel :05 (:01)  :07 (:14)  :47 (:14) :68 2:96 4:04
Italy :01 (:01) :43 (:15)  :12 (:17) :31 (:15) :78 2:46 1:73
Japan :01 (:01) :45 (:15) :31 (:15) :83 3:18 2:12
Korea :05 (:01) :00 5:07 4:65
Luxembourg :03 (:00) :00 2:79 2:17
Netherlands :01 (:00) :42 (:14) :42 2:34 2:21
New Zealand :01 (:00) :37 (:16)  :30 (:16) :54 1:31 2:39
Norway :03 (:00) :00 2:51 2:48
Portugal :02 (:01) :27 (:15) :27 3:29 4:87
Spain :01 (:00) :64 (:11) :64 2:69 1:91
Sweden :01 (:00) :44 (:14) :44 1:52 1:84
Switzerland :00 (:00) :63 (:12) :63 1:32 1:18
UK :02 (:00) :55 (:16)  :28 (:15) :53 2:51 1:80
USA :02 (:00) :31 (:15) :31 2:60 1:56
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. LAR is the modulus of the largest root of the
characteristic polynomial. signicant at 10%; signicant at 5%; signicant at 1%
Table A2: OLS estimates of the AR process in developing countries
0 1 2 3 LAR g(%) (%)
Argentina :01 (:01) :00 :84 6:10
Barbados :01 (:01) :00 1:43 6:39
Benin :01 (:01) :00 1:17 4:73
Burkina Faso :01 (:01) :00 :95 4:50
Bolivia :01 (:01) :22 (:14) :14 (:13)  :41 (:13) :75 :58 3:53
Brazil :03 (:01) :00 3:09 5:16
Burundi :00 (:01) :00 :27 8:00
Cameroon :01 (:01) :04 (:15) :37 (:15) :63 :89 5:63
Chile :03 (:01) :00 2:87 9:07
China :04 (:01) :31 (:15) :31 5:23 3:96
Cote dIvoire :01 (:01) :00 1:23 5:94
Notes: see Table A1
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Table A2: OLS estimates of the AR process in developing countries (Continued)
0 1 2 3 LAR g(%) (%)
Colombia :01 (:01) :01 (:14) :45 (:14) :68 1:44 2:52
Congo :00 (:02) :00 :21 1:05
Costa Rica :01 (:01) :30 (:14) :30 1:60 3:91
Dominican :03 (:01) :00 3:22 7:86
Ecuador :01 (:00) :39 (:14) :39 1:47 2:83
Egypt :03 (:01) :00 2:57 4:13
El Salvador :01 (:01) :56 (:13) :56 1:38 3:41
Ethiopia :02 (:01)  :28 (:15)  :28 1:46 8:36
Gabon :02 (:02) :00 2:25 11:56
Gambia :00 (:02) :00 :43 1:63
Ghana :00 (:01) :00  :23 6:99
Guatemala :00 (:00) :94 (:15)  :55 (:20) :36 (:15) :81 :53 1:28
Guinea :01 (:01) :00 :63 4:18
Honduras :01 (:01) :00 :91 3:69
India :02 (:01) :00 2:15 3:25
Indonesia :03 (:01) :24 (:15) :24 4:21 4:82
Iran :02 (:01) :00 1:57 8:37
Jamaica :00 (:01) :32 (:15) :32 :65 5:24
Jordan :00 (:01) :18 (:16) :28 (:15) :62  :17 7:54
Kenya :00 (:01)  :24 (:15)  :24  :25 7:14
Madagascar  :01 (:01) :00  1:24 3:89
Malawi :02 (:01)  :26 (:15)  :26 1:81 5:34
Malaysia :03 (:01) :24 (:15) :24 3:56 5:44
Mali :02 (:01)  :37 (:15)  :37 1:23 7:31
Mauritius :04 (:01) :00 3:79 9:29
Mexico :01 (:01) :25 (:15) :25 1:76 3:53
Morocco :02 (:01)  :28 (:14) :23 (:11) :64 2:33 5:00
Nepal :01 (:01)  :37 (:15)  :37 1:08 3:35
Nigeria :00 (:02) :04 (:15)  :45 (:15) :67 :23 1:26
Pakistan :02 (:01) :00 2:45 4:48
Panama :03 (:01)  :36 (:15)  :36 2:45 7:18
Paraguay :02 (:01) :00 2:02 4:87
Peru :02 (:01) :00 1:74 6:83
Philippines :02 (:00) :40 (:15) :00 (:16)  :32 (:14) :74 1:67 2:10
Rwanda :01 (:01) :00 :82 9:64
South Africa :01 (:00) :44 (:14) :44 1:46 2:24
Senegal :00 (:01) :00  :06 4:34
Sri Lanka :03 (:01) :00 3:20 5:06
Syria :04 (:02)  :35 (:15)  :35 3:00 13:76
Tanzania :00 (:01) :18 (:16) :23 (:14)  :32 (:13) :73 :38 3:29
Thailand :03 (:01) :33 (:15) :33 3:89 3:66
Trinidad & Tobago :02 (:01) :00 2:49 8:24
Uruguay :01 (:01) :23 (:15) :06 (:17)  :41 (:17) :77 1:30 5:96
Venezuela :01 (:01) :38 (:15) :38 :96 5:76
Zambia  :01 (:01) :00  :66 9:25
Zimbabwe :01 (:02) :00 :69 12:69
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. LAR is the modulus of the largest root of the characteristic polyno-
mial.  =one percent signicant,  =ve percent signicant,  =ten percent signicant
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B Higher risk aversion level
Table 9: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developed countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Australia 1:77 2:48 3:62 18:72 19:59 20:59  18:14  17:10  15:83
Austria 4:27 10:43 42:95 17:87 19:56 25:29  14:38  9:18 18:73
Belgium 2:79 8:68 47:72 17:80 20:40 31:57  16:72  11:84 18:37
Canada 3:34 6:02 14:40 18:69 20:20 22:40  16:78  14:06  6:71
Denmark 4:14 6:02 9:11 19:77 21:30 23:04  17:27  15:25  12:49
Finland 7:30 10:53 16:91 17:66 19:48 21:73  11:88  8:86  3:64
France 3:92 9:12 36:55 18:03 19:92 25:21  15:21  10:71 11:92
Greece 12:48 30:77 81:30 17:34 20:78 28:56  5:83 9:93 54:07
Hong Kong 20:65 40:70 85:08 15:20 18:39 24:57 4:37 22:42 61:98
Iceland 24:74 47:53 88:56 18:61 22:49 28:49 4:99 24:97 61:51
Ireland 9:48 19:34 58:92 17:72 20:20 26:38  9:52  0:86 33:84
Israel 7:19 11:17 20:82 17:49 18:87 20:99  11:23  7:70 0:43
Italy 3:25 8:11 44:01 17:20 19:62 29:74  15:50  11:42 15:73
Japan 18:08 46:11 90:87 18:26 23:24 31:39  1:00 22:70 61:86
Korea 11:68 17:35 28:74 14:44 16:10 18:61  3:75 1:28 10:88
Luxembourg 2:95 4:33 6:51 17:46 18:50 19:78  15:62  14:19  12:05
Netherlands 6:54 13:80 45:86 18:49 20:70 25:99  13:30  7:00 19:39
New Zealand 5:49 10:16 28:29 20:92 22:82 26:27  16:90  12:52 2:68
Norway 4:11 5:87 8:79 17:98 19:24 20:82  15:24  13:37  10:71
Portugal 21:63 43:44 86:50 17:70 21:66 28:47 2:74 21:82 59:52
Spain 9:95 22:02 66:86 17:75 20:99 29:38  8:95 0:93 39:69
Sweden 5:32 11:07 38:37 19:99 22:27 28:19  16:11  11:14 11:30
Switzerland 3:96 8:92 36:18 20:54 22:63 28:54  17:93  13:64 8:68
UK 4:00 7:62 24:07 18:12 19:60 22:70  15:27  11:83 2:14
USA 2:38 4:50 12:05 17:80 18:90 20:81  16:50  14:36  7:79
Table 10: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Argentina 35:73 59:00 91:85 23:60 29:77 38:48 9:72 28:94 56:90
Barbados 37:04 60:49 92:54 22:24 27:88 35:77 12:37 32:26 58:97
Benin 19:17 29:77 53:27 21:62 25:56 31:83  4:37 4:16 22:96
Burkina Faso 17:54 27:42 48:92 22:20 26:16 32:47  6:61 1:27 17:87
Bolivia 6:42 11:57 30:17 22:13 25:00 30:87  18:28  13:50 1:13
Brazil 18:39 28:48 49:42 17:66 20:62 25:33  0:72 7:93 24:99
Burundi 61:82 87:00 98:67 25:11 31:38 38:42 33:89 54:70 67:15
Cameroon 44:42 76:18 97:64 24:32 30:02 37:42 17:07 45:49 65:22
Chile 60:40 85:11 98:79 19:52 24:08 29:01 39:33 60:76 73:61
China 12:04 24:14 66:64 14:29 16:65 21:86  3:00 7:67 45:53
Cote dIvoire 32:27 52:68 88:23 22:33 27:94 36:16 7:68 24:82 53:48
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Table 11: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Colombia 11:02 26:92 76:00 21:28 25:11 34:10  11:85 1:91 43:27
Congo 75:90 93:42 99:36 22:69 27:48 33:43 49:72 65:54 72:91
Cost Rica 18:50 37:51 84:61 20:81 25:36 33:43  4:28 12:12 52:77
Dominican, Rep. 46:91 73:46 97:28 18:98 23:63 29:16 26:27 49:52 70:89
Ecuador 11:20 23:05 69:38 20:62 24:08 31:86  11:37  0:72 37:59
Egypt 11:76 17:82 28:86 18:15 20:51 23:74  7:82  2:80 6:30
EL Salvador 27:08 56:19 93:25 21:91 28:03 36:09 2:47 28:54 60:78
Ethiopia 41:64 67:39 95:43 22:79 28:05 35:25 16:43 39:33 63:91
Gabon 74:94 94:09 99:18 17:98 22:21 25:00 53:45 71:09 77:20
Gambia 78:65 91:86 99:59 21:52 25:28 30:57 53:97 67:03 73:91
Ghana 53:85 79:51 97:78 27:22 34:40 43:18 23:39 44:10 61:35
Guatemala 5:06 13:44 64:51 21:71 25:78 39:52  19:35  12:03 26:71
Guinea 15:64 24:04 41:84 22:75 26:69 32:56  9:60  2:47 11:47
Honduras 11:65 17:39 28:32 21:86 24:80 29:13  12:37  7:40 1:10
India 7:53 10:98 17:25 18:72 20:68 23:16  12:73  9:64  4:49
Indonesia 18:41 36:94 79:77 16:16 19:34 25:19 1:16 17:22 55:39
Iran 60:00 85:67 98:52 22:10 27:44 33:61 35:64 57:36 70:34
Jamaica 36:87 67:37 96:55 24:25 30:71 39:09 10:41 35:74 62:03
Jordan 1:96 82:46 99:10 0:13 28:15 36:31 1:82 52:44 69:02
Kenya 38:32 63:66 93:67 27:45 34:57 44:27 8:22 28:81 54:68
Madagascar 18:61 28:65 49:68 29:80 35:83 45:03  15:43  7:00 8:15
Malawi 14:72 24:06 47:63 19:92 23:03 28:51  6:89 1:10 21:24
Malaysia 26:29 49:99 90:45 17:58 21:58 27:91 7:25 28:17 64:21
Mali 28:87 49:68 86:34 22:65 27:62 35:45 4:38 21:72 53:70
Mauritius 58:99 84:40 98:63 18:21 22:13 26:55 38:77 61:84 75:38
Mexico 12:59 25:14 64:84 19:98 23:46 30:35  9:16 1:67 36:17
Morocco 19:83 37:74 80:54 20:30 24:30 31:62  1:63 13:45 49:90
Nepal 5:44 8:20 14:06 21:25 22:99 25:54  17:44  14:79  9:63
Nigeria 68:98 90:10 99:23 27:02 32:08 37:99 39:06 57:14 67:57
Pakistan 14:41 22:12 36:53 18:50 21:25 25:33  5:69 0:77 12:95
Panama 24:72 40:60 75:68 19:48 23:12 29:51 3:52 17:62 46:70
Paraguay 18:24 28:01 47:60 19:53 22:94 28:10  2:89 4:98 20:84
Peru 41:84 66:37 94:99 22:03 27:35 34:77 18:04 38:53 63:37
Philippines 2:365 4:154 9:371 19:302 20:866 22:887  18:834  16:705  11:907
Rwanda 72:64 91:85 99:31 22:52 27:10 32:58 47:20 63:64 72:56
South Africa 7:99 16:43 50:73 20:36 23:14 29:74  14:12  6:61 20:89
Senegal 19:20 29:24 50:12 25:32 29:96 37:56  8:96  0:66 15:02
Sri Lanka 17:40 26:29 44:83 17:39 20:09 24:29  1:30 6:30 22:15
Syria 71:21 91:82 99:34 19:23 22:80 26:93 50:04 68:56 76:54
Tanzania 6:21 11:90 35:46 22:51 25:58 31:90  19:03  13:50 5:11
Thailand 12:52 25:07 69:32 16:15 18:82 24:61  4:74 6:32 45:83
Trinidad & Tobago 54:60 81:04 98:07 20:70 25:28 30:95 32:08 55:33 70:81
Uruguay 16:85 31:53 76:46 20:84 25:40 34:04  6:72 6:40 44:02
Venezuela 45:53 76:00 97:57 23:49 29:35 37:35 18:88 45:52 65:76
Zambia 75:80 92:92 99:09 25:92 30:69 38:03 45:22 60:96 68:99
Zimbabwe 64:43 87:93 98:90 19:98 25:59 32:32 41:29 61:25 72:77
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C Higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution
Table 12: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developed countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Australia 1:29 1:79 2:61 31:13 32:07 33:03  31:31  30:27  29:03
Austria 3:42 7:68 31:81 29:40 32:82 34:89  30:14  25:04 1:53
Belgium 4:38 13:95 63:22 23:11 30:98 34:00  28:20  16:99 40:00
Canada 2:35 4:12 9:25 30:29 31:79 33:58  29:97  27:68  22:28
Denmark 2:73 3:85 5:82 29:55 30:80 32:17  28:51  26:94  24:55
Finland 5:64 8:09 12:25 30:98 32:93 35:01  27:88  24:84  20:33
France 3:04 6:50 25:68 29:04 32:32 34:47  30:17  25:89  3:76
Greece 10:25 24:62 75:05 27:78 33:05 37:13  24:16  8:43 45:86
Hong Kong 22:40 42:30 85:91 31:01 37:10 43:69  17:22 4:63 49:81
Iceland 21:26 36:20 73:21 28:30 32:02 35:85  11:60 3:72 41:97
Ireland 7:17 14:18 39:97 29:43 32:90 35:96  26:78  18:72 8:89
Israel 6:75 10:34 18:94 31:65 33:54 35:48  27:31  23:18  14:32
Italy 5:44 13:34 55:64 24:94 31:94 34:95  28:11  18:67 31:30
Japan 15:80 41:05 89:71 23:27 30:72 35:79  17:89 9:68 63:55
Korea 13:12 18:97 28:62 35:17 39:17 43:82  27:12  20:21  9:91
Luxembourg 2:43 3:40 5:18 32:19 33:51 34:97  31:76  30:08  27:87
Netherlands 4:65 9:00 25:86 29:32 32:00 34:45  28:07  22:85  5:64
New Zealand 3:49 6:14 14:81 28:37 29:92 31:46  26:87  23:77  14:94
Norway 3:09 4:41 6:54 31:25 32:76 34:34  30:29  28:34  25:77
Portugal 17:62 33:42 73:30 28:17 32:71 37:53  16:48 0:42 41:97
Spain 7:56 16:77 54:59 27:14 32:11 35:63  25:93  15:43 25:85
Sweden 3:24 6:39 18:50 28:11 30:34 32:32  27:67  23:94  10:94
Switzerland 2:34 5:29 20:63 27:51 29:98 31:84  28:35  24:61  8:16
UK 2:97 5:57 15:17 30:69 32:50 34:24  30:00  27:00  16:72
USA 1:85 3:31 8:30 31:47 33:04 34:57  31:80  29:72  24:01
Table 13: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Argentina 18:50 27:08 42:16 25:60 28:05 31:15  10:23  1:09 14:59
Barbados 20:51 31:09 47:77 26:13 28:99 32:34  8:87 2:06 18:97
Benin 11:05 15:59 24:13 27:05 29:19 31:72  18:91  13:51  4:68
Burkina Faso 9:67 14:10 21:27 26:78 28:83 31:23  19:66  14:87  6:89
Bolivia 7:00 12:18 29:23 26:23 28:30 29:99  21:72  16:11 1:53
Brazil 14:67 21:25 33:14 30:02 33:07 36:64  19:15  12:02 0:06
Burundi 33:22 48:81 77:96 23:27 26:13 29:78 6:35 22:67 51:42
Cameroon 28:70 55:83 93:18 23:27 26:89 30:64 0:90 29:00 67:38
Chile 48:27 71:83 95:71 25:70 29:75 34:86 17:68 41:73 65:77
China 14:35 26:31 65:53 33:42 39:02 45:08  26:91  12:92 28:14
Cote dIvoire 17:88 26:46 39:87 26:13 28:81 31:99  11:29  2:45 11:42
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Table 14: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Colombia 6:56 15:40 58:48 25:11 29:08 31:74  23:55  13:87 33:66
Congo 54:06 76:83 97:07 22:06 25:07 28:89 28:38 51:62 71:99
Cost Rica 11:19 21:02 54:73 26:56 29:66 32:97  19:15  8:71 25:28
Dominican, Rep. 36:28 54:45 84:82 27:40 31:55 36:62 3:99 22:55 53:58
Ecuador 6:59 13:16 38:80 26:85 29:82 32:35  23:88  16:85 9:86
Egypt 8:77 12:78 19:28 30:05 32:40 34:93  24:15  19:74  12:79
El Salvador 15:84 32:34 76:13 24:36 28:34 32:23  13:37 3:63 49:73
Ethiopia 26:25 41:59 75:64 25:48 28:66 32:10  3:37 12:85 47:15
Gabon 69:37 89:64 99:23 23:26 26:88 31:25 41:90 62:31 73:17
Gambia 59:48 82:57 98:43 21:90 24:98 29:02 33:97 57:52 73:54
Ghana 23:66 34:69 54:07 23:55 26:01 28:74  2:55 8:61 28:11
Guatemala 5:74 16:26 63:76 21:61 27:71 30:12  23:08  11:82 40:97
Guinea 8:22 11:88 17:97 26:53 28:38 30:39  20:44  16:50  10:31
Honduras 6:52 9:30 14:08 27:29 29:02 30:85  23:01  19:80  14:75
India 5:33 7:61 11:38 29:86 31:69 33:70  27:03  24:08  19:86
Indonesia 17:44 32:32 73:31 30:37 35:37 40:69  19:12  3:09 39:46
Iran 38:31 57:79 87:48 24:68 28:01 32:20 10:04 29:76 59:74
Jamaica 20:47 37:51 79:85 23:49 27:05 30:45  7:46 10:51 53:65
Jordan 48:95 78:30 98:17 21:21 24:31 27:72 24:06 53:73 74:54
Kenya 17:69 27:76 51:88 23:91 26:30 28:70  9:09 1:40 26:31
Madagascar 6:54 9:51 14:32 24:11 25:52 27:03  19:37  15:98  10:83
Malawi 10:61 15:67 26:69 28:18 30:46 32:93  20:42  14:71  3:48
Malaysia 21:65 40:15 79:96 28:42 33:06 38:13  12:46 6:76 48:88
Mali 18:56 28:28 48:17 26:10 28:69 31:44  10:61  0:52 19:58
Mauritius 54:67 76:85 97:21 26:99 31:59 37:39 22:34 44:83 66:13
Mexico 8:35 14:66 34:82 27:61 30:35 33:24  22:66  15:84 4:54
Morocco 14:27 24:19 52:09 27:08 30:25 33:18  16:93  6:04 23:43
Nepal 3:66 5:37 8:73 28:31 29:62 30:97  26:34  24:21  20:50
Nigeria 46:53 71:70 96:31 22:65 25:24 28:06 20:44 46:40 71:51
Pakistan 10:43 15:10 22:70 29:45 31:93 34:61  22:11  16:84  9:08
Panama 19:16 29:18 49:12 28:26 31:13 34:30  12:65  1:83 18:21
Paraguay 12:30 17:49 26:76 28:32 30:89 33:89  19:14  13:38  3:69
Peru 25:25 37:25 59:01 26:22 29:39 33:36  4:58 7:62 29:50
Philippines 3:07 5:43 12:55 29:42 30:80 32:33  28:02  25:37  17:97
Rwanda 49:70 73:59 96:16 22:93 26:08 30:12 22:98 47:40 70:05
South Africa 4:86 9:50 28:69 27:52 30:06 32:22  25:97  20:51  0:48
Senegal 8:62 12:39 18:87 25:49 27:17 29:03  18:91  14:86  7:94
Sri Lanka 14:21 20:36 31:54 30:27 33:36 37:08  19:86  12:99  1:55
Syria 71:38 90:16 99:15 24:99 28:70 32:97 41:82 61:27 71:06
Tanzania 6:54 12:42 34:01 25:89 28:02 29:75  21:85  15:69 6:98
Thailand 11:79 21:39 53:80 30:91 35:11 39:57  24:54  13:69 20:24
Trinidad & Tobago 38:62 59:18 88:08 26:03 29:75 34:73 8:59 29:16 58:38
Uruguay 20:05 36:46 75:40 25:68 28:46 31:37  8:88 7:81 48:71
Venezuela 28:01 52:37 91:81 23:18 27:02 31:30  0:48 25:04 65:98
Zambia 43:63 65:15 93:14 21:63 24:39 27:85 18:89 40:54 69:05
Zimbabwe 74:32 91:97 99:38 21:04 24:17 27:79 49:86 67:63 76:17
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D First sub-period: 1960-1985
Table 15: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developed countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Australia 0:76 1:51 5:07 18:21 19:41 21:15  19:07  17:83  14:72
Austria 1:13 1:78 3:11 15:77 16:91 18:18 2:81 3:50 4:23
Belgium 3:20 9:79 54:48 15:70 18:94 31:95  15:09  8:72 23:44
Canada 1:75 2:79 4:89 17:88 19:59 21:74 1:32 2:16 3:01
Denmark 2:09 5:62 37:49 18:36 21:49 26:99  19:31  15:60 12:91
Finland 2:91 4:77 8:39 15:69 17:51 19:97 2:20 3:35 4:48
France 1:99 7:58 39:63 17:26 20:61 38:00  17:26  12:90 6:74
Greece 4:94 14:03 66:82 14:41 17:54 26:89  11:41  3:51 41:91
Hong Kong 4:43 7:19 13:48 11:67 13:22 15:43 5:09 6:76 8:41
Iceland 9:92 19:67 63:38 14:90 18:01 24:72  6:94 1:75 38:92
Ireland 3:72 7:24 26:03 17:94 20:10 24:94  16:74  12:44 2:83
Israel 4:34 9:71 31:41 17:21 18:98 22:42  13:74  9:61 9:56
Italy 1:80 5:83 49:77 15:47 17:68 33:12  15:37  12:13 22:77
Japan 5:11 14:88 64:78 13:83 17:01 26:38  10:44  2:19 39:08
Korea 2:79 5:32 13:22 13:05 14:71 17:15  11:69  9:78  1:22
Luxembourg 3:61 8:62 35:47 16:84 18:91 23:86  14:68  10:07 12:97
Netherlands 6:73 15:53 55:55 16:98 19:71 25:97  12:05  4:01 30:65
New Zealand 2:98 5:78 17:15 20:54 23:10 27:11  20:40  17:17  7:85
Norway 2:10 3:34 5:78 16:50 18:07 20:08 1:98 2:94 3:85
Portugal 20:38 42:36 87:48 15:07 21:14 33:15 3:73 22:05 61:22
Spain 5:51 12:95 52:92 17:44 22:68 36:37  15:50  10:09 25:81
Sweden 2:84 6:32 25:62 19:21 21:28 26:04  18:20  14:81 1:41
Switzerland 1:67 3:94 21:74 18:74 20:68 25:39  19:17  16:60  1:83
UK 1:24 2:33 8:11 18:39 19:80 21:88  19:09  17:44  12:47
USA 2:64 5:78 22:34 16:85 18:53 21:57  15:79  12:70 1:48
Table 16: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Argentina 8:65 16:89 50:34 20:60 24:67 32:32  15:34  7:68 18:85
Barbados 14:76 25:42 56:62 19:33 25:15 36:55  0:93 1:15 3:29
Benin 9:81 16:78 34:11 18:32 22:64 30:41  0:19 1:62 3:49
Burkina Faso 7:25 12:15 24:21 20:70 25:05 32:29  0:93 0:58 2:11
Bolivia 11:24 26:94 72:31 22:27 27:31 38:01  13:51  0:41 43:65
Brazil 7:41 12:41 24:22 13:70 16:30 20:29 2:73 4:65 6:57
Burundi 10:36 18:95 47:32 19:85 23:43 30:06  12:15  4:41 19:18
Cameroon 12:43 21:46 44:54 17:51 22:11 30:54 0:07 2:07 4:13
Chile 44:75 75:54 97:36 17:63 24:75 34:93 0:47 3:17 6:73
China 8:91 25:64 81:31 14:13 18:49 27:85  7:50 7:00 55:06
Cote dIvoire 9:42 15:77 32:22 16:85 20:69 27:67 0:48 2:39 4:36
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Table 17: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Colombia 3:36 9:14 52:59 18:07 20:90 31:36  16:77  11:75 23:10
Congo, Rep. 19:32 40:80 87:48 17:21 22:59 32:44  1:10 17:88 57:59
Costa Rica 23:72 49:38 92:23 20:27 26:75 36:86  0:17 22:12 59:71
Dominican. Rep. 9:83 23:57 64:84 16:45 19:74 26:29  8:15 3:48 39:97
Ecuador 8:52 21:89 73:29 17:45 21:07 29:37  10:74 0:33 45:80
Egypt 6:73 11:12 20:59 15:82 18:67 23:30 1:40 3:13 4:81
El Salvador 29:12 60:59 95:03 20:93 28:21 38:43 4:70 31:30 62:22
Ethiopia 4:29 6:86 12:52 20:60 23:72 28:12  0:32 0:76 1:93
Gabon 40:55 67:39 94:96 17:80 22:86 30:71 20:09 44:98 69:42
Gambia 48:04 77:42 97:62 22:37 31:45 44:08  1:12 1:05 3:90
Ghana 26:50 52:30 94:80 30:93 41:09 64:81  11:94 6:39 43:03
Guatemala 7:92 29:08 84:16 21:64 29:59 50:63  19:14  0:08 43:02
Guinea 8:08 20:49 74:42 26:88 35:00 56:69  25:27  14:45 23:41
Honduras 7:60 12:73 24:27 19:45 23:56 30:57  0:51 1:10 2:65
India 5:15 8:33 15:28 18:74 22:08 26:77 0:08 1:43 2:83
Indonesia 6:57 10:97 21:01 14:00 16:48 20:21 2:64 4:41 6:25
Iran 34:47 62:23 94:64 18:52 26:28 37:61  0:26 2:15 5:19
Jamaica 14:93 26:22 56:35 21:68 28:39 41:99  1:66 0:24 2:19
Jordan 51:85 81:49 98:11 19:94 26:36 34:20 27:33 53:85 70:88
Kenya 37:32 65:65 95:82 28:06 37:46 50:20 4:44 27:44 54:73
Madagascar 16:20 36:50 82:87 28:72 36:72 52:62  17:68  0:66 37:94
Malawi 12:25 23:23 61:97 19:23 22:86 30:39  8:80 0:28 32:49
Malaysia 5:64 9:20 16:79 15:15 17:55 21:16 2:04 3:61 5:18
Mali 15:81 29:20 66:69 21:19 28:17 42:63  1:70 0:40 2:53
Mauritius 42:27 71:88 96:91 16:14 22:04 30:67 1:49 4:36 7:79
Mexico 9:33 21:79 65:81 18:13 21:70 29:80  11:07  0:01 37:75
Morocco 20:43 42:82 87:43 18:00 22:97 31:95 0:44 19:37 57:32
Nepal 3:23 5:78 14:99 22:75 25:08 28:40  22:13  19:08  11:47
Nigeria 39:22 69:81 96:63 24:17 34:12 47:46 8:86 34:78 59:97
Pakistan 6:93 11:64 22:54 15:59 18:59 23:04 1:51 3:18 4:95
Panama 6:25 12:72 43:26 17:31 19:70 24:75  12:47  7:22 18:85
Paraguay 5:70 9:57 17:86 15:86 18:41 22:41 1:57 3:13 4:69
Peru 35:70 66:92 95:86 18:33 24:57 32:65 14:33 42:04 67:67
Philippines 4:12 8:61 39:43 18:51 21:44 27:60  17:63  12:40 15:56
Rwanda 28:15 52:58 90:43 19:60 27:94 41:44  0:91 1:31 4:09
South Africa 6:36 17:14 65:24 19:63 23:30 34:21  15:21  6:35 32:97
Senegal 8:66 14:51 28:90 23:22 29:11 39:16  1:91  0:40 1:22
Sri Lanka 11:22 19:54 38:74 16:63 20:39 27:67 0:60 2:68 4:67
Syria 61:92 87:07 98:92 15:25 18:78 22:79 44:58 67:87 79:75
Tanzania 8:71 23:41 79:14 22:86 30:21 47:10  19:36  6:99 35:39
Thailand 1:85 2:92 5:10 15:76 17:27 19:13 2:44 3:35 4:31
Trinidad & Tobago 24:89 57:07 92:59 16:05 22:85 32:89 5:21 32:47 64:23
Uruguay 10:22 19:92 65:52 22:92 26:54 37:65  16:47  7:13 29:68
Venezuela 35:43 68:07 96:59 18:14 23:66 31:31 14:89 44:31 69:90
Zambia 34:02 61:79 95:04 21:04 30:28 44:26  1:26 0:92 3:85
Zimbabwe 45:43 75:92 98:03 18:92 26:22 36:40 0:18 2:61 5:89
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E Second sub-period: 1986-2003
Table 18: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developed countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Australia 8:24 17:87 56:62 15:33 18:80 26:50  9:33  0:97 32:83
Austria 0:63 1:07 2:06 18:79 20:12 21:60  20:39  19:03  17:45
Belgium 0:53 1:33 18:36 19:21 20:62 25:84  20:81  19:07  9:52
Canada 0:70 1:17 2:21 19:23 20:64 22:38  20:95  19:46  17:80
Denmark 1:30 4:06 24:84 18:96 22:38 27:32  21:78  18:41 0:63
Finland 3:01 5:44 11:27 18:07 20:89 25:21  18:74  15:46  10:49
France 0:80 2:43 13:16 19:50 21:12 26:34  20:91  18:31  12:24
Greece 4:40 9:32 31:93 20:46 23:77 30:09  19:21  14:14 4:02
Hong Kong 6:16 11:19 25:32 15:78 19:23 25:35  12:87  8:03 3:37
Iceland 1:94 4:71 24:45 19:69 23:18 28:35  21:92  18:32  1:51
Ireland 1:66 5:00 36:16 14:50 16:50 24:93  14:66  11:37 14:52
Israel 1:05 2:67 10:36 16:69 18:32 21:43  17:63  15:55  7:58
Italy 1:23 3:86 20:11 18:82 20:80 29:53  20:00  17:30  5:20
Japan 2:21 9:08 57:46 19:23 23:63 42:13  20:50  14:32 18:90
Korea 6:42 14:56 52:25 13:38 15:86 19:97  8:64  1:10 34:08
Luxembourg 2:50 5:47 21:72 17:42 19:27 23:19  16:70  13:65  0:03
Netherlands 3:09 10:26 61:31 19:15 22:46 33:38  18:11  11:97 29:42
New Zealand 2:46 7:53 48:45 17:66 21:15 28:78  18:85  13:29 22:22
Norway 1:21 2:06 4:14 18:41 20:22 22:46  20:00  18:08  15:75
Portugal 1:73 5:50 29:44 16:84 19:27 26:01  17:06  13:53 7:34
Spain 1:48 4:73 36:09 17:15 19:07 25:06  18:11  14:48 16:52
Sweden 5:60 15:92 66:37 20:12 24:47 36:10  17:73  8:43 32:96
Switzerland 0:40 1:24 12:08 21:14 23:02 27:44  23:44  21:65  13:31
UK 1:84 5:16 33:80 16:67 19:05 26:44  17:18  13:65 7:78
USA 1:11 3:08 22:39 18:03 19:70 24:36  18:71  16:49  0:41
Table 19: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Argentina 10:65 23:95 69:24 25:27 33:24 51:59  22:56  8:94 24:59
Barbados 14:57 28:21 68:55 17:10 23:07 35:95  6:39 5:11 35:52
Benin 4:89 8:79 18:36 20:39 24:60 31:92  20:88  15:73  8:35
Burkina Faso 7:36 13:48 31:85 18:15 22:81 31:43  15:28  9:32 4:58
Bolivia 0:60 1:78 26:06 20:66 22:46 27:90  22:59  20:55  5:88
Brazil 4:66 8:21 17:32 19:68 23:79 30:25  20:06  15:27  8:20
Burundi 8:98 22:98 78:99 17:90 24:36 36:88  13:99  1:49 46:06
Cameroon 13:24 25:25 58:45 23:76 33:12 51:20  19:36  7:66 14:17
Chile 2:55 4:44 8:83 13:59 15:40 17:84  13:12  10:88  7:04
China 5:96 12:42 39:48 18:45 22:10 28:81  15:58  9:62 12:12
Cote dIvoire 17:12 34:07 77:64 21:87 31:43 52:97  11:80 2:08 31:51
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Table 20: Posterior quantiles of welfare e¤ects in developing countries
 (%)  (%)  (%)   (%)
:005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95 :005 :50 :95
Colombia 7:47 17:43 61:95 16:58 20:61 29:62  12:01  3:15 36:38
Congo 3:29 7:53 36:59 18:32 21:43 27:92  18:08  13:70 9:94
Costa Rica 5:09 13:09 56:32 18:38 21:77 30:08  15:88  8:60 28:70
Dominican. Rep. 12:19 33:71 90:95 16:52 22:84 38:52  8:19 12:05 56:16
Ecuador 3:86 7:95 24:88 23:03 26:47 32:49  22:90  18:30  4:05
Egypt 2:38 4:05 8:41 17:85 20:41 23:94  18:90  16:27  12:40
El Salvador 7:97 23:13 78:11 17:80 22:39 32:78  12:67 0:46 48:36
Ethiopia 42:59 74:94 97:59 14:78 21:40 30:93 25:13 52:88 74:21
Gabon 14:34 36:43 84:52 22:42 31:92 44:67  15:12 5:16 42:64
Gambia 33:50 64:45 95:19 16:12 23:12 33:76 14:50 40:01 67:84
Ghana 4:76 12:65 63:77 19:22 23:14 31:09  16:97  10:22 33:30
Guatemala 0:27 0:90 9:07 20:60 22:11 25:06  22:60  21:23  15:71
Guinea 8:47 20:46 67:54 15:39 19:09 27:33  9:29 1:47 41:35
Honduras 1:32 2:27 4:41 21:41 23:68 26:58  23:89  21:37  18:68
India 0:87 1:48 2:87 16:26 17:53 19:07  17:37  16:01  14:37
Indonesia 5:45 9:66 19:65 14:24 16:98 21:44  11:27  7:28 0:84
Iran 12:93 25:32 62:45 17:44 23:51 35:90  8:84 1:58 29:55
Jamaica 7:36 13:67 30:72 17:96 22:95 31:83  15:14  8:97 3:84
Jordan 44:82 74:64 96:99 27:14 38:11 54:14 9:40 34:88 59:00
Kenya 25:86 55:26 92:96 23:12 31:52 45:10  1:47 22:22 55:69
Madagascar 13:44 28:84 77:82 27:08 34:73 51:08  19:70  6:02 33:98
Malawi 12:87 27:96 77:44 17:98 22:58 31:51  7:36 5:17 48:09
Malaysia 12:41 23:54 55:29 14:71 19:26 28:68  5:09 4:20 29:68
Mali 28:11 55:07 93:04 16:59 23:70 35:82 8:67 30:71 62:94
Mauritius 3:07 5:41 11:01 13:39 15:19 18:04  12:32  9:72  4:93
Mexico 10:60 24:97 73:49 18:97 23:93 34:06  11:60 0:81 42:62
Morocco 5:58 10:48 28:54 20:68 23:52 28:53  17:65  12:74 1:75
Nepal 1:89 4:85 29:65 18:07 20:34 26:17  18:59  15:30 4:70
Nigeria 39:48 71:03 96:94 18:93 26:79 37:70 16:44 43:20 67:51
Pakistan 4:16 7:35 15:30 18:61 22:10 27:58  18:73  14:60  8:14
Panama 11:28 26:47 81:37 15:82 20:46 27:60  8:30 5:29 49:70
Paraguay 9:72 17:78 44:80 20:44 26:52 39:51  16:58  8:47 8:84
Peru 39:67 73:19 97:51 22:99 32:80 46:98 9:96 38:62 63:11
Philippines 0:18 0:42 1:60 19:71 20:35 20:96  20:35  19:84  18:86
Rwanda 40:98 71:98 96:63 17:56 25:83 38:81 18:88 44:97 67:39
South Africa 4:94 13:83 62:01 17:99 21:79 30:04  16:31  7:88 36:84
Senegal 7:03 12:74 29:21 20:44 25:75 35:72  19:38  13:07  1:28
Sri Lanka 2:58 4:54 8:80 14:51 16:45 19:12  14:32  11:92  8:14
Syria 50:50 80:32 98:01 21:34 29:39 39:55 23:27 49:67 68:81
Tanzania 3:99 9:40 42:63 18:47 22:07 30:09  18:07  12:52 15:01
Thailand 6:21 11:42 25:02 13:82 16:61 21:70  10:12  5:22 5:74
Trinidad 19:08 49:56 94:62 12:16 20:08 32:52 1:61 29:16 70:43
Uruguay 20:25 46:13 90:87 17:22 24:55 37:10  0:78 23:27 60:32
Venezuela 19:49 45:32 90:27 27:85 37:64 56:80  14:29 6:17 44:08
Zambia 41:62 72:87 97:51 22:40 34:24 52:99 11:55 36:49 60:69
Zimbabwe 55:27 84:06 98:78 15:15 21:28 29:99 35:71 61:29 77:18
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